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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERING
Seasoned Equity Offerings are an important source of funding for firms listed securities market.
Private firms go to public and raise equity through initial public offerings (IPOs). After the IPOs,
public listed firms may return to the securities market to issue additional equity. The equity offerings
can be made via the three major methods: underwritten public offerings (cash offerings), rights
offerings, and private placements. The repeated equity issuance conducted by public firms is termed
Season Equity Offering (SEO). After SEOs, the equity issuing firms attain cash proceeds and
increase its outstanding shares.
The SEOs themselves exert discernible effects to the operating performance of the issuing firms
after the issuances. The cash proceeds will be used for different purposes, such as to invest in
business expanding projects, to buying new assets, to retire debt, or just to maintain in the firm’s
account. Depending on managers’ chosen usage and their management efficiency, the proceeds may
or may not be able to offset the costs of equity, which includes both issuing costs and dividends
required by SEO investors. SEOs may also bring in new shareholders, altering the firm’s ownership
structure, and thus, possibly changing the firm’s management practices. As a result, in the short term,
SEOs directly affect the firm’s post-issue profitability. And these changes would eventually be
reflected on the firm value in the long run.
To investors, newly issued shares are an alternative for the existing listed shares of the same
company. Investors may have a number of reasons to prefer the newly issued shares to the listed
shares. Investors outside the firm may be attracted by prospective business projects advertised by the
firm’s management before the issuance. Current shareholders somehow are forced to buy new shares
in order to prevent their ownership from dilution, especially in rights-issuing SEO. Private
placement buyers may purchase the newly issued shares for either financial purposes or management
control power.
2In the short term, price volatility can be the reason for speculator to buy the newly offered
shares. But ultimately, the decision to buy the SEOs will be based on the same foundation as the
decision to buy the common shares: Investors will buy the shares that they expect the future value of
the stock will exceed the today’s offered price. Therefore, the expectation of the company’s
post-issuance profitability, in other words, operating performance, is the key for investors to base
their decision of purchasing the SEO stocks.
To date, the link between SEOs and the post-issue operating performance of firms issuing
equity has been widely studied by international literature in various developed securities markets
like the US and Europe. Most of the studies have reported that in general, firms conducting seasoned
equity offerings have poor operating performance in the period after the issuances, compared to
similar non-issue listing firms. This conclusion brings a tough reality to investors who have
intension to buy SEO stocks. However, it also suggests that investors with effective bases to assess
the potential profitability of the equity issuers will definitely be able to pick out the most profitable
ones.
This thesis studies the investors’ assessment and selection of SEOs in the Vietnam stock market
in order to provide recommendations helping them select the most profitable companies to invest in.
Based on a list of SEO-examining criteria established from international literature about SEOs, the
research examines Vietnamese investors’ capability in assessing the long-run profitability of firms
conducting SEOs. Then, recommendations are provided to help Vietnamese investors improve their
decision making at SEOs. The author’s motivation is generated from working experience as a
securities broker in the Vietnam stock market, where SEOs and their consequences have been a
remarkable phenomenon.
31.2 OVERVIEW OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS IN VIETNAM
Vietnam securities market has a short story compared to well developed markets in the US or
Europe. Established in 2000 with a stock exchange in Hochiminh city, the securities market for the
first time created a new channel of raising capital for Vietnamese companies. However, the young
stock market had not grown as expected for a long time due to intrinsic characteristics of the
long-time planned economy. Even though Vietnam had stated to transform from a highly-centralized
planning economy to a market-oriented economy via the 1986-dated “DoiMoi” policy, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) still dominated the country in terms of capital in the beginning years of 2000s.
These SOEs were traditionally using capital distributed from national budget and at-ease loans from
big banks, which were also mostly stated-own. Most of private enterprises were relatively
small-sized (Figure 1) and not qualified to be listed on the Hochiminh securities market, which set
the minimum equity at 80 billion VND (approximately 5 million USD at that time) as a listing
required condition. Therefore, both enterprises and investors did not actively join the stock market
for a long period.
Figure 1: Number and equity size of companies in Vietnam in 2005: Private firms dominate the
economy in terms of number but account for only 25% of the whole firm equity in the economy.
State-owned firms are less in number, but larger in size.
Source: General Statistic Office of Vietnam, www.gso.gov.vn
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4The Vietnam stock market started to thrive since 2006 when Vietnam was expected to become a
member of the WTO in the next year. The government initiated to privatize a number of major
stated-own companies and released new policies encouraging the development of the private sector.
To help small and medium sized enterprises to mobilize capital, a new stock exchange was
established in Hanoi city, requiring only VND 10 billion (USD 625,000) of equity as a minimum
listing condition. Capital monitoring regulations were also relaxed to welcome investments from
international investors. As a result, the market experienced a blooming period with a number of
companies going IPOs and listed in the excitement of both domestic and foreign investors since
2006.
Figure 2: Quick expansion of Vietnam stock market: The number of listed companies and the
market size increases dramatically in 2006
Source: Author computed based on data provided by Vietnam Securities Committee
Since 2007, the securities market has expanded gradually and officially became a major capital
mobilizing channel with more and more companies going listed. On the other hand, the achievement
of continuous high GDP growth has created optimism over the economy. Investors, both domestic
and oversea, with strong expectation of the economic prospective, were excited to buy new issued
shares.
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5Figure 3: Vietnam’s GDP growth: GDP growth rate peaked in 2007 when Vietnam entered WTO,
increasing the investors’ willingness to buy with new shares.
Source: General Statistic Office of Vietnam, www.gso.gov.vn
In that historical condition, Seasoned Equity Offering became a popular phenomenon in
Vietnam since 2007, when many firms had accomplished their IPOs and started to raise equity for
the second time. Because seeking funds from banks still demanded tough conditions which only
stated-own firms with collateral assets and government endorsement could qualify, listed firms
usually prefer share issuances than debt issuances. Especially, since the interest rate in the economy
has been strongly increasing in recent years, borrowing money from banks became more and more
difficult and costly for companies. Therefore, utilizing the optimism and expectation of investors,
listed firm conducted SEOs as many times as possible to multiply their equity.
Figure 4 illustrates the number of shares issued by listing firms doubled from 2008 to 2009, and
then, doubled again in 2010. Listing firms were trying all ways to multiple their equity. It is
surprising that all the supply has been absorbed by investors’ demand.
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6Figure 4: The number of share issued successfully via seasoned equity offerings every year
Source: Vietnam Securities Committee, Annual Fact Books, www.ssc.gov.vn
Issuing shares to raise equity became a common trend of firms listed on the securities market
since 2007 up to now. On average, every year, each listed firm issued shares once to increase its
equity. (see table 1) In the period from 2007 to 2010, 672 firms listed on the two stock exchanges
have conducted SEOs total 1789 times. In other words, on average, within four years a listed firm
issued equity 2.66 times. Especially, in the financial year 2010, 672 listed firms organized 671 SEOs,
meaning that on average, every firm issued equity once in this year.
Table 1: The frequency of SEOs conducted by listing firms in Vietnam: On average a listed
companies completes 1 SEOs every year in Vietnam.
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of completed SEOs 458 322 338 671
Number of listed firms 243 333 454 672
Average SEOs per firm 1.88 0.97 0.74 1.00
Source: Vietnam securities committee, www.ssc.gov.vn
Among share issuing methods, SEOs (public offerings, right issues, private placements)
dominate other equity raising methods such as stock dividends or convertible bonds in Vietnam. This
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unused. This implicates that when raising equity becomes more difficult, firms listed in Vietnam
stock market tend to exploit their shareholders with issuing rights,
buy rights in order to avoid owners
However, it seems that shares issuers did not care of the consequences
SEOs. Even though the newly acquired equity generates pressure on the profitability of the firm,
managers of listed firms did not likely pay attention
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8The consequences of excessive and slapdash SEOs became visible almost immediately. Most of
the SEOs conducting firms used the new equity proceeds inefficiently and thus demonstrated poor
operating performance in the long term subsequent to the events. The average EPS and ROA of
firms listed on the two stock exchanges in Vietnam decreased dramatically in the period from 2007
to 2010, destroying the wealth of shareholders (Figure 6)
Figure 6: Declining operating performance of seasoned equity issuers in Vietnam
Source: Saigon Securities Incorporation, www.ssi.com.vn
The poor profitability of equity issuing firms eventually resulted in deteriorated firm value and
reflected on the stock prices. The stock market index fell from the peak of 1170 points in March
2007 to one-third in 2008 and since then, it has never fully recovered. Despite the long term
downtrend of the market, listed companies still flooded the market with their new issuance. The
tendency of raising equity seems not to relax when listed firms still organized 152 SEOs in the first
half of 2011 and planned to do more than 300 others in the second half of the year.
The consequence is not only that investors keep losing money for their wrong investment at
poor profitable SEOs. The efficiency of the capital market is also reduced in a sense that the
investment funds from investors are distributed without discrimination of firms. Firms with excess of
cash are still able to raise additional equity while firms with urgent needs of funds are not.
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9Figure 7: The long-term downtrend of Vietnam securities index since 2008
Source: Saigon Securities Incorporation, www.ssi.com.vn
On the other hand, the problems could not be created by the issuing firms only. Investors, who
have been purchasing seasoned equity offered shares, also played an important role. In general,
investors buy the additional shares of a firm because they expect that in the long-run, the new
proceeds will help the firm to increase its profitability thus, increase the share value and the share
price.
However, in the case of Vietnam stock market, investors are not likely able to assess whether
the post-issue profitability growth can keep up with the equity growth. They seemed to be confused
at too many offers from listing companies. Possibly investors do not know how to examine the
potential profitability after equity issuance of firms doing SEOs and thus, buy the offered shares
injudiciously. A clear evidence of this situation is that investors continued to buy newly issued shares,
helping to increase the number of successful SEOs, even when the profitability of issuers were very
poor in the recent years as analyzed above.
This thesis studies factors which help examining the potential profitability after SEOs of listed
firms and use those factors as criteria to investigate the capability in assessing SEOs of investors in
Vietnam. Recommendations then are generated to help investors select the most profitable SEOs.
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1.3 SCOPE OF OBJECTIVES
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to help Vietnamese investors to enhance the quality of their
assessment of companies’ long-run profitability and thus, improve their investment decision at SEOs.
Valuable recommendations to investors are established through achieving following objectives.
- To provide Vietnamese investors with comprehensive academic knowledge of corporate
financing decisions in general and equity issuance in particular. Understanding corporate
managers’ underlying motivation of choosing SEOs as a method of capital mobilization,
investors will be able to judge the profitability of issuing firms with an “inside mind”, and
thus, make more rational investment decisions.
- To identify all factors reported in previous studies to be signals of the increase of decrease
in post-issue profitability of SEO firms. These factors will be used to create a list of
criteria enabling investors to assess the future profitability of equity issuers.
- To examine Vietnamese investors’ awareness and usages of those criteria, as well as their
own criteria if any, in regarding their decision of purchase SEO shares.
1.4 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The thesis researches throughout current literature concerning SEOs in order to create a list of
criteria to assess the long run post-issue profitability of the SEO firms. These criteria are established
from various factors reported discretely in a number of previous SEOs-related studies as signals of
the issuing firm’s operating performance in the long run after the events.
Then, the criteria are used as questionnaires in a survey to investigate investors’ capability of
selecting the most profitable SEOs in the Vietnam stock market. The survey collects investors’
ratings on the influence of those criteria to the post-issue operating performance of the firms issuing
shares, as well as other criteria proposed by investors themselves. Details of the design and content
of the survey are presented in Chapter 3.
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Both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied to analyze the data collected by the
survey. Quantitative analysis is applied on the primary data of investors’ ratings in order to generate
findings about their awareness and usage of the SEO examining criteria suggested by international
literature. Qualitative analysis is used to indentify local criteria used by investors in Vietnam when
they evaluate and select SEOs considering characteristics of the emerging market.
Based on the findings generated from data analysis, the thesis draws conclusion on the
assessment and purchasing of SEOs of investors in Vietnam. Considering the current situation of the
market and predicting its future development pattern, the author offers recommendations to investors
to help them improve capability of selecting the most profitable SEOs.
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is presented orderly from introducing basic concept of SEOs, identifying problems,
reviewing the literature, collecting and analyzing data, and finally, drawing findings and
recommendations. The completed research writing is divided into four chapters:
Chapter 1 “Introduction” presents brief discussion of Season equity offerings and the
importance of evaluating the issuing firm’s profitability to investors’ investment decision. The SEO
situation and in the Vietnam stock market and its problems from investor point of view are also
described, leading to the necessity of the research. Then, the objectives, research method, and
structure of the thesis are introduced to give an overview of the contents.
Chapter 2 “Literature review” researches comprehensively global literature on SEO-related
corporate capital structure theories, and the link between SEOs and post-issue operating performance
of a firm. At the end of this chapter, a list of criteria to help investors assessing the operating
profitability of equity issuers is created from factors associated with post-issue operating
performance of SEO firms.
Key research questions to be answered:
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 Why do managers conduct SEOs?
 How do SEOs affect the firm’s future profitability?
 What factors help to predict future profitability of a firm conducting SEOs?
Chapter 3 “Analysis of investors’ assessment of SEOs in the Vietnam stock market” analyzes
results of a survey on investors in Vietnam to investigate their awareness and usages of the SEOs
selecting criteria established from literature. The results of the analyses help to explore investors’
capability when they assess and purchase SEO shares in Vietnam.
Key research questions to be answered:
 How do investors assess and select SEOs in the Vietnam stock market?
 Do they follow the criteria suggested by international literature about SEOs?
 How do the findings help to explain the SEOs-related problems in Vietnam?
Chapter 4 “Conclusion” presents summary of major findings, recommendations to solve the
problems, contributions of the thesis and implications for future research
13
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter summaries key theoretical studies and relevant empirical evidences regarding
seasoned equity offerings. To help investors improve their capability in assessing SEOs, the author
believes that it is necessary first to understand about the underlying motivations encouraging firms to
choose to organize equity issuances over other methods of fund raising. Thus, the first part of this
chapter reviews all major explanatory and empirical literature regarding corporate capital structure,
financing decision, and their links with SEOs. Then, the second part of this chapter reviews
throughout literature about the long-run post-issue operating performance of firms conducting SEOs
for factors signaling these firms’ profitability. At the end of this chapter, identified factors are refined
and integrated into a list of twenty criteria to assess the post-issue profitability of the equity issuers
in the long run.
2. 1 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS ON SEO
The terminology “capital structure” refers to the way a firm sponsors its assets by funds raised
from either equity or debt or hybrid securities. Then, a firm's capital structure is the composition or
its equity and debt. SEO, as one of the three basic ways a listing firm raising capital, has immediate
effects on the firm’s capital structure by reducing the debt ratios. Thus, SEO has direct effects on
both short term and long term stock returns and operating performance of a firm. In order to make
investment decision at a SEO, it is important for investors to understand companies’ motives of
organizing the offering.
They may ask following questions when considering an offer from equity issuers. Why do the
managers issue equity but not debt? What are the driving forces of equity or debt issuing actions?
How do the issuances affect the firm value, and thus the wealth of stakeholders? Does an SEO mean
that managers are altering the firm’s capital structure to an optimum point, which can help to
increase the firm value later on, or they are in serious financial deficits? Is it just a “market timing”
action exploiting the favorable capital market situation or investors’ optimism to mobilize abundant
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cash, which later may decreases the firm value if managers misuse the proceeds to low profitability
projects? By answering such questions, investors will have an “insider mind” like corporate
managers’ when evaluating the effects of the SEO to the future firm value. This does help investors
to make the right choice at many equity offerings made by corporate managers.
To date, corporate finance literature has been well developed to explain the way managers make
decision on their firms’ capital structure. Even though, what really determines the capital structure is
still a topic of debates. Explanatory theories can be summarized into three basic models, which are
the Pecking Order Theory, the Trade-off Theory, and the Market Timing Theory; and some of their
hybrids.
Tracing back to the origin of related studies, corporate capital structure theories are initiated by
Modigliani and Miller (1958) with a famous argument that in perfect markets changes in capital
structure have no effects on firm value. In a perfect capital market, where information is perfect and
there is no transaction or bankruptcy costs, and no taxes, investment decisions are not affected by
financing decisions. Thus, the total cash flow generated by the firm’s assets is independent from how
the assets are financed. In other words, capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Miller and
Scholes (1978) later confirm the irrelevance of capital structure even when taxes are considered.
Although M-M theories are considered purely theoretical for their assumption of a perfect or
nearly perfect world, they provide the basis for later studies to investigate the relationship between
capital structure and firm value in the real world. By adding back relaxing assumptions to the M-M
model, other theories have been developed and empirically tested in order to provide alternative
explanation on capital structure. This section reviews three basic theories: the pecking-order theory,
the trade-off theory, the windows of opportunity theory, and their related empirical tests, as well as
some other later-developed explanatory theories.
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2.1.1 The Pecking Order Theory
The Pecking Order Theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) as the most traditional
interpreting model for capital structure. The model starts with asymmetric information - a
terminology meaning that managers know more about their companies’ prospects, risks, and values
than outside investors do. Asymmetric information influences the choice between internal and
external financing, and the choice between debt and equity securities at a new issue.
Acknowledging their disadvantages, outside investors are willing to buy risky securities issued by
firms only at a discounted price. In other words, externally generated funds are more costly than
internally raised funds. Consequently, according to the principle of least effort, managers prefer to
raise funds from internal sources, which have less resistance than external sources. This results in a
pecking order, in which investment is financed primarily by internal funds, retained earnings; then
by new issues of straight debt, then convertible debt; and finally by new issues of equity. New equity
issues are a last resort when the company has exhausted of debt capacity, and SEO of common
stocks is the last choice among methods of equity issuing.
As a result, there is no optimal capital structure that firms pursue. Myers (2001) stated “changes
in debt ratios are driven by the need for external funds, not by any attempt to reach an optimal
capital structure. Each firm’s debt ratios reflect cumulative effects of internal cash flow, net
dividends, and capital requirements of investment opportunities”.
As a prediction of the Pecking Order Theory, publicly announced SEOs are not common events
and if a firm conducts a SEO, it must have run out of debt capacity, which means existing creditors
have been already concerned enough of the firm’s financial distress threats. This reasoning leads to
some further implications. First, firms conducting SEOs are less profitable than other firms at the
time of offerings because they could not have sufficient internal funds for their projects. When the
needs of funds for investment surpass the internal funding ability, the firm is force to borrow more
and more. And if the firm issues equity, that means it cannot borrow anymore, or in poor financial
condition. Second, firms having to work down the Pecking Order Theory to “the last effort” – equity
16
issue have high possibility to experience poor operating performance afterward. They must have
ended up living with excessive debt, missing good investment opportunities due to the lack of
financial slack, and using the most costly fund – equity for next investments. Third, but in contrast,
if the firm is able to issue excessive equity rather than needed, it will enjoy financial slack, meaning
having cash, marketable securities, or easily saleable assets. It would be able to have access to debt
market and bank financing, and thus be ready for later good investment opportunities. Therefore,
these firms may improve profitability after the equity offering.
The Pecking Order Theory’s shortcomings are then supplemented by many other empirical
studies. Donalson (1961) quoted the difference between transaction costs of the debt and equity
issues as another reason of the pecking order, in addition to the asymmetric information.
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) document the evidence of systematic leverage rebalancing as
a reason of the pecking order, but conclude that the evidence is weak at equity issuers. Heaton
(2002) attributes the managers’ preference of debt over equity issuance to managerial optimism.
Optimistic managers tend to believe that the firm’s future performance is rosier than expected by the
capital market’s outlook. Those managers prefer to follow the Pecking Order Theory to prioritize
internal funds, bearing in their mind that the capital markets undervalue their firm. In other words,
optimistic managers are unwilling to conduct SEOs for their belief that their stock is underpriced.
Frank and Goal (2003) support the Pecking Order Theory by finding that net equity issues track the
financing deficit quite closely in the 1990s in the US.
In contrast, many other studies contradict the Pecking Order Theory with strong evidences.
Liang and Helwege (1996) report that managers’ decisions to generate external capital do not
associate with the lack of internally generated funds. This is inconsistent with the Pecking Order
Theory. Frank and Goal (2003) test a sample of American firms in the period 1971 to 1998. They
find out that listed firms usually issue and purchase back equity while debt financing does not
dominate equity financing, inconsistent with the general theory. They indicate that transaction costs
are the cause of financing decision. Fama and French (2005) show that firms frequently issue equity
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annually, contradicting to the Pecking Order Theory’s prediction that equity issues are the last resort.
DeAngelo and Stulz (2007) challenge the Pecking Order Theory when finding that SEO firms’ debt
ratios do not increase significantly in the two years before the offering.
2.1.2 The Trade-off Theory
The Trade-off Theory initiated by Kraus and Litzenberge (1973) states that the optimal capital
structure reflects the trade-off between costs and benefits of debt. The theory adds taxes and costs of
distress to the purely perfect world in the M-M model and argues that these factors affect corporate
value. Debt increases firm value by generating tax shield, for instance, debt interest is deductable
from taxable income. As a firm adds up debt, the present value of tax shields grows up but the
marginal increase deteriorates. On the other hand, as the level of debt gets higher, the marginal cost
of distress soars as well. The costs of distress include bankruptcy costs and non-bankruptcy costs
such as staff leaving, suppliers demanding disadvantageous payment terms. At a certain point, the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost and the costs of distress surpass the tax benefits, causing
deterioration of the firm value. Therefore, managers optimize their firm value by targeting their
leverage to the equilibrium point.
The firm value can be broken into three parts as below:
Firm value = Value if all-equity-financed + PV (tax shield) – PV (cost of financial distress)
Figure 8: Illustration of the Trade-off Theory
(Source: Brealey-Meyers, Principle of corporate finance, 7th edition, p498)
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The Trade-off Theory implicates that firms always target to an optimal capital structure. The
firms always tend to move their leverage toward the target. Especially, profitable firms prefer to
borrow more in order to create more tax shields as long as the actual debt ratio is still lower than the
optimum leverage. Equity issuance therefore becomes the last choice of managers.
Another implication of Trade-off Theory on SEO is that firms may issue debt subsequent to the
equity offering to move their leverage back to the point prior to the offering. Because SEOs result in
more equity, meaning debt ratios are reduced, if the firm has been at or lower than the target leverage
at the time of the SEO, it would increase the leverage by issuing more debt. The magnitude of the
post-SEO debt issues is positively correlated with the financial leverage deviation made by the SEO.
This consequently leads to a situation in which managers have excessive cash and the firm’s value
could be reduced if this cash is misused in negative NPV projects.
Evidences supporting the trade-off theory are strong. Graham and Harvey (2001) find in their
survey of CFOs that 81% of managers claim to make financing decision with a target leverage. Fama
and French (2002) partially confirm some predictions of the trade-off theory from the perspective of
dividend payout. Hovakimian and Armen (2004) confirms the role of target leverage in issuing and
repurchasing securities. Leary and Roberts (2004) report that firms are conservative at financial
policy most of the time nonetheless, issue and repurchase securities to adjust toward the target
leverage. Flannery and Rangan (2006) indicated that firms do have target capital structures with the
partial-adjustment model. Kayhan and Titman (2007) prove that firms do rebalance their leverage
toward a target, although the adjustment process is slow. Huang and Ritter (2007) document that
firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed.
In contrast, many studies suggest that the target leverage is irrelevant. In consistent with the
trade-off theory, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002b) show that higher
profitable firms have lower leverage. Graham and Harvey (2001) reports that even profitable firms
with low costs of financial distress do not aggressively issue debt. Welch (2004) finds that stock
return is a determinant of capital structure and firms do not issue and repurchase debt and equity to
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offset the mechanistic effects of stock returns on their capital structure.
Empirical evidence about the relationship between the Trade-off theory and SEO is rare. The
most well-known study is of Masulis and Korwar (1986). They observe SEOs conducted in the
period 1963 - 1980 result in leverage changes. However, the relation is very modest.
2.1.3 The Market Timing Theory
The Market Timing Theory states that managers time the market to issue equity when they
know the firm is overvalued compared to book value and past market values; and repurchase equity
when the firm is undervalued. In addition, the relative cost of equity (the cost of equity compared to
the cost of other forms of capital) varies over time, and this variation is a determinant of capital
structure choices. Thus, managers’ financial decisions have mechanistic and immediate effects on the
firm’s capital structure.
Barker and Wurgler (2002), who are considered major supporters of the Market Timing Theory,
report that the resulting effect of market timing actions on the capital structure is persistent. If
managers do not intentionally rebalance the leverage, the capital structure is a cumulative outcome
of historical market timing efforts. They further indicate that managers do not move their firms’
capital structure toward a target. “There is no optimal capital structure, so market timing financing
decisions just accumulate over time into the capital structure outcome” (Baker and Wurlger 2002).
This argument is shared by Welch (2004) with a finding that historical stock returns are the most
important determinant of market leverage across firms and at the extreme, there is no optimal capital
structure. The argument of non-exist optimal leverage is also shared by Pecking Order Theory.
However, the difference is that according to the Pecking Order Theory, the debt ratio is the
cumulative of result of hierarchical financing decisions over time.
Ritter (1991) support the Market Timing Theory by a research mainly focusing on IPOs of
common stock. The author finds that the concentrations in volume in certain years are associated
with taking advantage of “windows of opportunity”.
20
In literature, SEO is generally regarded as a strong evidence of the Market Timing Theory.
Ritter (1995, 1997) show empirical evidence that firms conducting SEOs experience stock price
underperformance and declines in operating performance. Even though it is unclear whether issuers
purposely sell overvalued equity, this finding is consistent with the Market Timing Theory to some
extents. The argument later is confirmed by Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). They find that
managers are able to determine whether the market is willing to overpay, or is currently overpaying,
for their stock. As a result, managers tend to take advantage of the window of opportunity to issue
equity. According to Graham and Harvey (2001) in a survey with CFOs in the US, most of managers
admit their market timing actions, and consider the degree of stock overvaluation or undervaluation
a very important factor in equity issuing decisions. Consistent with the Market Timing Theory,
DeAngelo and Stulz (2007) show that market timing strongly influenced SEO decisions although it
is not the primary determinant of stock issuing decisions.
Several other studies indicate that SEO is the cumulative result of the Market Timing and other
factors. Huang and Ritter (2007) provide evidence that publicly traded U.S. firms tend to use more
external equity to fund a large proportion of their financing deficit when the cost of equity capital is
low. This implicates that SEO is the result of both market timing model and static trade-off model.
Kim and Weisbach (2007) find that market timing and investment financing is motivation for SEO
conductors. Firms raise equity for investments but also raise abundant cash from the offerings.
The literature on the connection between the Market Timing Theory and SEO can be
summarized as following. First, firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when the firm market value
is high, and tend to repurchase equity when the firm value is low, according to financing decisions
analyses. Second, firms tend to issue equity at times when investors are rather too enthusiastic about
earnings prospects, according to analyses of earnings forecasts. Third, managers admit to market
timing in anonymous surveys organized by Graham and Harvey (2001).
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2.1.4 Other theories about the link between capital structure and SEOs
Besides the most well-know Pecking Order Theory, Trade-off Theory, and Market Timing
Theory, different theories have also been developed to explain the stock performance and operating
performance of firms conducting SEOs. The new theories in general do not go against the traditional
models. Instead, they are based on the sharing points of competing theories, making compromise of
their viewpoints, or pointing out additional explanatory variables.
As reviewed in the previous sections, Huang and Ritter (2007) show evidence supporting both
Pecking Order Theory and Market Timing Theory. Kim and Weisbach (2007) find that both
investment and market timing are motives for equity offerings.
Carlso, Fisher & Giammarino (2006) find that SEOs may be driven by market timing activities.
However, different from previous studies, their methodologies are based on a real options framework.
The framework of real options considers rational expectations and actively coherent corporate
financing decisions aiming to those expectations. Their findings further indicate that the stock price
increase before SEO typically reflects an increase in the value of profitable growth options that the
issuers may have. It suggests that the future profitability of SEO firms is prominent and recognized
by the market. Thus, SEO firms are good investment opportunities for investors. This is inconsistent
with the assumption of Market Timing Theory that the market overvalues the firm value so SEO is a
signal of future underperformance.
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) examine the relation between stock prices, market valuation,
market fundamentals, and the corporate investment decisions during the periods of big market crisis
in 1929 and 1987. The key prediction is that stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of
"equity-dependent" firms - firms that need external equity to finance marginal investments. This
means market valuation has a limited role. Although market timing influence financial decisions, it is
not the primary motivation. They imply that SEO and corporate financing decisions can have
fundamental explanations.
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Developing this idea, DeAngelo and Stulz (2007) test whether SEO decisions are better
explained by market timing opportunities or by a fundamentals-based theory. The fundamentals-based
theory assumes that firms issue equity primarily in the early stages of their lifecycle, when growth
opportunities exceed internally generated cash flow. They gauge the importance of timing
opportunities by measuring market-to-book ratios, prior and post-SEO stock returns, and observe the
lifecycle stage by the number of years listed. The conclusion is that both market timing and lifecycle
proxies significantly influence the SEO decisions but the lifecycle effect is stronger. However, both
of them are not adequately explains SEO decisions. Instead, the primary motivation of an SEO is a
near-term cash need. Without the SEO proceeds, most of the sample issuers would not have sufficient
cash to implement their operating and investment plans in the year after the SEO. Thus, firms conduct
SEOs to resolve a near-term liquidity problem, and not primarily to exploit market timing
opportunities.
To sum up, literature reviewed in this section shows that there are multiple ways to explain
managers’ financing behaviors in general and equity issuing decision in particular. However, it
seems that the Market Timing Theory and the adverse selection theory are the most empirically
supported, and most explainable to SEO phenomenon. In short, investors should bear in mind that
managers usually have information advantages over investors and tend to waste excessive equity at
cost of shareholders. This does helps investors understand factors determining the post-issue
operating performance as reviewed in the next section.
2.2 SEOS AND POST-ISSUE OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF THE ISSUERS
2.2.1 General relationship between SEOs and operating performance
The concept “operating performance” is defined and measured differently in literature
depending on the purposes and methodologies used in different studies. However, in general, the
term “operating performance” commonly refers to a set of accounting measures illustrating the
profitability of a firm, for instance, profit margin (PM), return on asset (operating ROA), return on
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equity (ROE), cash flow, or free cash flow. Depending on the scholars, these measures may be
redefined in details, for example, operating income to asset ratios may be used instead of general
ROA or free cash flow to book ratio is used instead of pure free cash flow. To be consistent with
most of studies on the relation between SEOs and operating performance, in this thesis, the term
“operating performance”, or “profitability”, is understood as a set of three accounting measures:
operating income to sales ratio, operating income to assets ratio, and free cash flow.
The operating performance figures of equity issuers are crucial to investors’ investment
decision at SEOs because they are all reflected in the firm value and share value in the long run,
leading to variation in the stock price performance. Therefore, the expectation of future operating
performance of a firm is the key for investors to base their decision of purchasing its newly issued
shares.
Recent studies on SEOs in a number of advanced stock markets including the US, the UK,
Canada, and France have widely researched about the link between a SEO and the issuer’s post-issue
operating performance. In general, it is commonly reported that firms conducting SEOs experienced
significant long-term operating underperformance in the period following the events compared to
non-SEO firms with similar size. Figure 8 is a typical illustration of the poor post-issue operating
performance of SEO firms.
Figure 9: Comparison of operating income at equity issuers and non issuers
Source: Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter (1997)
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Figure 10: Profit margin decreases significantly at equity issuers
Source: Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter (1997)
However, literature also shows that the standard deviation of post-issue operating performance
of SEO firms is usually large. This means some SEO firms perform better than others, and depends
much on the capital market situation while some SEO firms even outperform the market (Abhyankar
and Ho (2002), Later, Autore, Bray, Peterson (2009)). Also, SEO shares are usually attractive to
investors for their highly-discounted price. Thus, investors with effective screening criteria may be
definitely able to select those outperforming SEOs from the pool and get extraordinary returns.
This chapter reviews major theoretical and empirical studies conducted around the world in
order to list out factors associated with SEO firms’ post-offering operating performance. These
factors would be used as SEOs-screening criteria helping investors to assess the future profitability
of the firms doing SEOs. For instance, if a factor which has negative relationship with the firm’s
post-issue operating performance is identified at a SEO firm, a rational investor would lower his
expectation about the firm’s profitability, and its shares price growth. Accordingly, he should lower
his buying desire and examine other characteristics of the firm more carefully.
The next section starts with studies in the US, where literature on SEOs was initiated and
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extensively developed. Then, literature on SEOs in other later-or-less developed markets is reviewed
and compared with original findings in the US in order to provide thorough understandings of
explored factors.
2.2.2 Factors signaling post-issue operating performance of SEO firms in the US
The first two factor influencing SEO firms’ post offer operating performance are information
asymmetry level and market overvaluation to the firm value. These influencing factors could be
directly predicted from the Pecking order model and the Market timing model, two of the most basic
capital structure theories reviewed in the previous section. The pecking order model proposed by
Myers and Majluf (1984) argues that in a world of information asymmetry, managers are better
informed than other stakeholders. They know more about the firm’s business situation, prominent
profitable projects, and potential profitability so they evaluate the firm value more precisely than
outside investors do. Besides, managers use SEO as the “last resort”, which implies that a firm
decides to issue equity when it is already unable to fund its projects by retained earnings or new
debts. The Market timing model initiated by Baker, Malcolm, and Wurgler (2002) then states that
managers tend to issue equity when they know their firm is overvalued. The combination of these
two models results in an adverse selection behavior of managers. Managers may conduct the SEOs
without goals of optimizing their firm value. For example, if a manager with private information
showing that the firm’s future cash flows are going to fall, he tends to prefer new equity issuance.
The SEOs surely improve the firm’s cash inflow after the offerings. However, having more cash
cannot solve everything. It may just be a mean to help managers cover up their poor businesses or
current negative projects. Consequently, in the long run, the operating performance may decline as
reflection of things that have been covered up. Another example is the case when managers time the
overvaluation of the market to issue abundant equity without any plan to use the proceeds. Thus,
while the assets increase, the profitability (ROA for instance) of the firm may decrease because
managers do not invest the new proceeds into any value creating projects, or even misuse them to
negative NPV projects.
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On the other hand, managers who know that the firm is undervalued may abandon or delay the
equity issues, which could have been invested in valuable projects if raised. As a result of this
adverse selection, the firm’s operating performance will be badly affected. To sum up, a high level of
information asymmetry and an overvaluation from the market cause managers to make decisions on
SEOs in ways harmful to the operating performance.
In a similar reasoning, the number of expectedly positive NPV projects a firm secures around
its SEO is considered a determinant of the later operating performance. The agency costs theory
proposed by Jensen and Michael (1986) argues that there are serious divergences of interests
between managers and shareholders of a firm. Managers tend to issue equity in order to maintain
excessive cash flows in the firm, and they might misuse the free cash flow by practicing invaluable
activities at cost to shareholders. Meanwhile, shareholders usually have difficulty to force managers
to pay out cash instead of wasting it to such value reducing activities. As a result, if the firm does not
have sufficient fruitful investment opportunities, managers may use the new proceeds ineffectively
and lower the firm’s profitability. Financial slack provides readiness for managers to respond to
opportunities. Nonetheless, if there is limited or no prospective project the costly raised abundant
cash becomes a burden of the firm, reducing the operating performance. Therefore, the limited
number of existing and future positive NPV projects at the time of the SEO is also considered a
factor predicting the declines of post-issue operating performance.
Continuing this idea McLaughlin, Safiedddine and Vassudevan (1996) point out several factors
to identify underperforming firms among 1,296 equity offers during the period 1980-1991 in the US.
The scholars show that SEO firms have significant improvements in operating performance prior to
the issue but these firms experience a sharp decrease in profitability following the SEO in both
industry-adjusted and unadjusted comparisons. The cash inflow and the reduced management
ownership due to the equity issues intensify the agency problem and lead to poor profitability. They
also find that high-leverage firms and high-growth firms tend to issue more equity, and experience
poor post-issue performance than other firms.
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The consequence of reduced management ownership is understandable in two ways. First,
when the management ownership is diluted by the cash inflow from the SEO, managers are
obviously less benefited from the firm’s profits. Accordingly their self-responsibility, commitment,
motivation to keep the firm’s high profitability at high levels as prior to the SEOs would decrease,
making the firm operate worse than prior to the SEOs. Second, even if the managers maintain their
efforts as prior to the SEOs, they may not be able to operate the business as usual because their
authority and power are reduced by new shareholders. Then, the operating performance would
decline if the reduction lowers the management’s capability.
The findings on high-leverage and high-growth firms can be explained by the three traditional
capital structure theories. According to the Pecking Order Theory, high-leverage firms issue equity
because they are already exhausted of internal funds and debt-burdened. Another possibility is that
managers of high-leverage firms issue equity in order to balance the capital structure, as the
Trade-off Theory predicts. In both circumstances, the newly-raised equity may be used mostly for
interest and debt payments, or just kept in hands but not for value-creating projects. Therefore, the
possibility of declining operating performance is apparent.
In addition, these McLaughlin, Safiedddine and Vassudevan (1996) report two other
determinants of long-run operating performance: free cash flow before the SEOs and investment in
fixed assets after the SEOs. They find that the decline in profitability is greater at firms with higher
free cash flow prior to the SEOs. Meanwhile SEO firms using newly-raised equity to invest in new
fixed assets perform significantly better than SEO firms that do not.
In common sense, a high free cash flow is usually a sign of good operating capability and
increasing firm value. It also usually means that the firm has sufficient cash to fund their business
internally. However, as the Market Timing Theory indicates, managers tend to do SEOs even it is not
necessary for the firm to have more cash. Thus, an additional amount of cash coming from SEOs
may be abundant. With more financial slack, managers tend to increase the adverse selection, for
instance, an easy approval of a low-return project. Consequently, while the new proceeds are costly,
28
they are not spent effectively. This process definitely leads to profitability reduction or declining
operating performance. On the other hand, firms usually invest in fixed assets if they already have
clear investment purposes, for example, core business improvement or expansion plans. The returns
from well-planned investments usually offset the cost of equity. Therefore, the operating
performance of SEO firms which invest the proceeds to fixed assets is on average higher than that of
those do not invest in fixed assets in the long run.
Lougharan and Ritter (1997) report “high-volume market” as another factor. In details, the
degree of underperformance varies over time: firms issuing during years when there is little issuing
activity do not underperform much at all, whereas firms selling stock during high-volume periods
severely underperform. Hence, the capital market situation is determinant of the post-SEO operating
performance. The finding is based on an examination of 1,338 seasoned equity offerings during
1979-1989 in the US. The authors use a set of accounting measures including operating income to
assets ratio, profit margin, return on assets, operating income to sales, capital expenditures plus R&D
expenses relative to assets, and market value of equity relative to book value of equity. They confirm
that the profitability of SEO firms improved significantly before the offering, but deteriorates
immediately and persistent after the event, in comparison with matching-size non issuers.
The Market Timing Theory may help to explain how the high-volume market relates to the later
poor operating performance. According to the theory, when the market is “hot” managers definitely
tend to utilize investors’ optimism to issue equity without caring of later usage. On the other hand,
when there are many equity issuing activities by other firms, the costs of the SEOs must be higher
than in usual periods, when the demand of equity is lower. In short, in high volume periods, the SEO
firms tend to pay more for the new equity but use it less effectively, which lead to lower operating
performance.
The usage of the SEO proceeds is proved to be another key factors determining the firm’s
operating performance. Fangjian (2006) investigates 5000 SEOs in the period 1970-2002 in the US
in order to find determinants of the post-issue operating underperformance, which is measured by
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ROA. Firstly, the authors examine the use of the SEO proceeds: invest, retire debt, increase working
capital, and cash storing. The results show that the major use of the proceeds is to expand investment
including capital expenditure and acquisitions. Secondly, the author examines the relation between
the investments made by the proceeds and the operating performance. Overinvestment is defined as
the investments in unnecessary or value reducing projects, which push the firm out of its optimal
investment point. The finding confirms that overinvestment is an explanation of the reduction in
operating performance of SEO firms. SEO firms with newly raised money tend to invest more
heavily than non-issuing firms and experience poorer operating performance. The problem is more
severe at SEO firms which have less investment opportunities.
Fangjian’s finding on the role of the factor “overinvestment” strengthens previous literature’s
conclusion on the role of investments made from the new equity in the post-issue period. Using the
new equity to invest rather than for other purposes is the best way to help the firm outperform other
SEO firms. However, it does not mean that any investment is good for the firm. The new cash brings
to managers more relaxation in making investment decisions. On the other hand, the new
shareholders usually generate more pressure to managers, forcing them to find and invest to
prospective projects as soon as possible. As a result, managers are pressed to and have more room to
make less profitable investment decisions, which are named “overinvestment” by Fangjian. The
firm’s operating performance therefore declines subsequently due to overinvestment as Fangjian
indicated.
Later, Autore, Bray, Peterson (2009) point out the recapitalization purpose of the SEO is
another factor, while also reconfirm the factor “investment purpose”. They investigate the relation
between SEOs’ stated intended use of proceeds and their subsequent long-run operating performance
in the US. Stated intended uses of SEO proceed are categorized into three groups: recapitalization,
investment, and general corporate purposes. The finding is that if the stated intended uses are
recapitalization or general corporate purposes, the firms experience abnormally poor performance in
the subsequent three years. However, if the purpose of the SEO is “investment”, the firm displays
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little or no subsequent underperformance. In other words, a credible indicator of positive post-event
operating performance is the speciﬁc plans to use the proceeds for investment purposes, whereas 
issuers without specific investment plans are more likely to be opportunistic market timers.
Firms that conduct SEOs in order to restructure their capital structure or fund general corporate
purposes are usually in financial deficits because their internal funds may not sufficient and debt
may be already excessive, as implicated by the Pecking Order Theory. Thus, these firms
underperform firms using SEO proceeds for investment purposes. However, if the stated investment
is not specifically planned, it may be just a fake reason managers have created to lure the new
optimistic investors when they “time” the market. In contrast, if the SEO proceed is used to the
well-planned investments, returns from those investments would offset the cost of new equity. Thus,
SEO firms with well-planned investment purposes generally outperform other SEO firms, and even
outperform the market.
2.2.3 Factors signaling post-issue operating performance of SEO firms in other
countries
The next section reports factors through literature in other developed markets like the UK,
France, Japan, and less developed markets like Thailand and China. Although most of current studies
about SEOs is majorly concentrated in the US market, literature in other markets are important in
two ways: they sometimes offer empirical verification of factors identified in the US; and they
sometimes report new factors associated with characteristics of the local market.
Patel and Lee (1993) study the long-term free cash flow of SEO conducting firms in France.
They find that the size of the SEO compared to the existing equity is a negative determinant of the
post-issue operating performance. Patel and Lee’s evidences show that equity issuers outperform the
industry prior to the offerings but underperform following the events in terms of profitability. The
larger the offering size is, the more severe the post-issue underperformance is.
The finding is explainable if we connect it to the factor “reduced management ownership”
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reviewed above. If the management has very low ownership to the firm before the SEOs, the
“reduced management ownership” problems may not occur after the new issues. However, the logic
is reversed in firms which management ownership is high. The larger the SEO is, the more
management ownership is diluted due to the SEO, and thus the more post-issue operating
performance declines. Further implication is that the SEO size is more important at small or newly
public firms conducting SEOs, where the entrepreneurs are still major owners of the firms.
The factor “management ownership” is just partly rejected in a study of Japanese firms.
Loughran and Jun Cai (1998) examine Japanese firms conducting 1389 SEOs in the period
1971-1992 in Japan. They found that these firms’ operating performance has persistent deterioration
for up to 5 years after the events. The study suggests that even though the corporate governance in
Japanese firms is different from that of US firms neither the Keiretsu system nor the Japanese unique
ownership structure can be a cause of the poor post-issue operating performance.
In addition, the study finds that the higher pre-issue profitability and the larger pre-issue
profitability improvement lead to the more severe decline in the post-issue operating performance.
Therefore, the “window of opportunity” theory is considered a possible explanation of the
phenomenon. Because managers know that they would issue equity easier if the market overvalues
their firm value, they may try to create the “overvaluation” by making the firm more attractive to
investors. The profitability improvement prior to the SEOs may be the evidence of the purposely
preparation. Managers may focus resources to create short-term profitability scarifying long-run
profitable projects, or even manipulate accounting figures to make a rosy picture of the firm despite
any costs. In the long run, all of these activities will transfer their costs into declines in operating
performance. Another possible explanation is that after obtaining the new equity, managers may feel
relaxed, and therefore, their efforts to improve profitability may be reduced. Thus, the operating
performance of the firm deteriorates sharply after the SEO.
In the UK, studies show different conclusion about the relation between SEOs and post-issue
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operating performance. Abhyankar and Ho (2002) use a calendar-time methodology to investigate a
sample of 700 SEOs via rights issues in the period 1989–1997. They reported no average negative
abnormal performance for equity issuing companies. However, using a standard event study
methodology to test the same sample, they found a significant abnormal loss in operating
performance for issuing firms after the SEOs. Therefore, they conclude that long-term abnormal
performance measurement is very sensitive to the methodology adopted. Meanwhile, Ngatuni,
Capstaff, and Marshall (2007) provide strong evidence on the post-SEO underperformance based on
multiple benchmarks and classification procedures. The authors reported a 41.8% abnormal loss for
issuers compared to their matching-size non-issuers. This finding is consistent with the general
findings in the US.
Panagiotis (2009) suggests that the long-term underperformance is significantly related to a
deterioration of companies’ operating fundamentals, especially the industry performance, in the
post-offering period. The research examines a sample of 1542 equity offerings via right issues in the
period from 1988 to 1998 in the UK. The operating performance is measured by a group of five
indicators: Growth in Turnover, Growth in Earnings Before Tax, Net Proﬁt Margin, ROA, and 
Growth in Fixed Assets. The finding is that companies raising equity in the form of rights issues
consistently under-perform their non issuing peers during the entire 36-month period following to
the events. Further, the research categorizes the sample firms into two groups: “Best” and “Worst”
post-issue operating performers. The comparison between these two groups reveals that fast-growing
firms with over-optimistic or overconfident management have significantly acute long-term
underperformance. This evidence is consistent with the managerial overconfidence and
“empire-building” hypotheses defined by Jung et. al. (1996)
The correlation between the industry performance and the SEO firm’s operating performance is
strong because when the whole industry is in downturn, there should be less profitable opportunities
for SEO firms to utilize their new and costly equity. Thus, the SEO firms should experience less
profitability than the non-SEO firms.
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Meanwhile, it is necessary to consider the equity raising habit of UK firms in order to
understand the consequence of over-optimistic and overconfident management. In contrast to the US,
where most SEOs are conducted via cash offerings, UK companies in past decades predominantly1
raised new equity by making rights issues (Armitage, 1998; Levis,1995; Marsh, 1979; Slovin,
Sushka, & Lai, 2000). This method allows companies to protect existing shareholders by avoiding
the potential dilution of their wealth and loss of control following an equity issue. On the other hand,
the rights issuing method also preserves management ownership ratio and their power from the new
equity issue. While managers have more cash in use, they may not have to meet any new
requirement from new shareholders, or scarify any controlling power as in cash-offering SEO
circumstances. Managers will easily fall into over-optimism and over-confidence, which allow them
to make poor investment decisions with the new proceeds at cost of shareholders. The problem is
more severe at fast-growing SEO firms, where managers have already been optimistic about the
firm’s future before the issues and eager to expand the business quickly. Consequently these poor
investments will reduce the firm’s profitability after the SEOs.
The relationship between SEO conducting methods and the SEO firms’ operating performance
is also studied in newly emerged markets, where firms have characteristics different from those in
developed markets like the US, the UK or France.
Studies on SEO conducting methods and their effects on post-issue operating performance were
conducted by Dang and Yang (2007) in China. Dang and Yang examine the choice between rights
offerings and public offerings of Chinese firms conducting SEOs. They find that rights offering
firms experience better long-term operating performance than firms issuing under-written public
offerings do. This is consistent with to Panagiotis (2009)’s conclusion at the SEOs in the UK.
The reason is attributed to Chinese securities regulations, which set stricter requirements for
right issues SEO than for under- written offerings. For example, firms are required to have minimum
3 year consecutive positive profitability prior to an intended rights issue. These requirements help to
eliminate most of poor operated SEO firms before their right issues. Meanwhile, there is little
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requirements for firms conducting SEOs via under-written public method. And thanks to the
optimistic emerging market and well-cooperated under writers, these firms can easily obtain new
equity without tough requirements from public investors, and thus, they tend to use the new equity
less efficiently than rights issuers. Therefore, firms conducted SEOs via right issues outperform
firms using underwritten method.
However, the requirements can create bad effects to Chinese rights issuers’ operating
performance in a loop whole. Chen and Yuan (2004) study earnings management activities in
Chinese firms issuing rights over the 1996 to 1998 periods. They conclude that firms use
‘aggressive’ accounting techniques to manipulate their performance prior to rights offerings tend to
easily turn to underperformance immediately after the events. Investors therefore are suggested to be
very careful when choosing rights-offering- type SEOs to invest in.
Further, Paskelian and Bell (2010) confirm Chen and Yuan’s conclusion when examining the
long-term operating performance of 777 equity offerings in China from 1998 to 2004. The results
show that firms conducting SEOs via private placement method have better long-term operating
performance than the market while firms using rights offering method have lower results. The study
views the Chinese securities regulation on equity issuances, which establishes strict profitability
requirements to rights offers, as the major cause of the phenomenon. Approved firms were more
prone to earnings manipulation to meet the regulatory requirements. However, the negative effects of
the earnings manipulation translated into long-term underperformance. Conversely, firms using
private placements outperformed due to enhanced monitoring provided by the placement buyer.
Additionally they conclude that the identity of the equity placement buyers, who select and monitor
the SEOs for their own benefits, also relates to the long-term profitability of the SEO firms.
Experienced and demanding placement buyers tend to help the SEO firms to outperform other firms.
Regarding the relationship between the role of the buyer in the SEOs and the firm’s operating
performance, Thomas, Jiao, and Yawen (spring, 2011) find two other positive factors: institutional
investors’ demand and SEO under-pricing spread. The scholars developed a model for SEO process
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with involvement of institutional investors. The model consists of three basic phases: the SEO
announcement, pre-offer trading, and the offering itself. First, the model further predicts a positive
relation between institutional investors’ net buying in the pre-offer and the post-SEO operating
performance. Firms with higher institutional investors’ demand in the pre-offer trading phase tend to
have better operating performance after the event than others. Second, the model proves that the
level of SEO under-pricing, which is measured by the offering price run-up in the period between
phase 1 and phase 2, has a positive link to the post-SEO operating performance.
In an emerging market like China, institutional investors are usually considered more
professional and “wiser” than most of individual investors, who are generally young to the securities
market and lack of educated valuation methods. Therefore, a SEO with high institutional investors’
involvement is usually a well-selected firm with examined prospective profitability. Furthermore,
when these “wise” institutional investors compromise to pay high price for SEO stocks as the
offering price run-up shows, it implicates that the future operating performance of the firm
conducting the SEO is firmly clarified. Therefore, when institutional investors buy more of and pay
more for a SEO, the SEO firm usually has post-issue market operating out- performance.
Studies in another emerging market – Thailand, also confirms many factors proposed by studies
in advanced markets. Limpaphayom and Ngawutikul (2004) report the ownership structure of the
firm as a major determinant of the post-issue operating performance. Given a fact that in Thailand
the ownership structure of firms is highly concentrated to insiders, they conclude that firms with
higher insider ownership concentration suffer more severe declines in operating performance than
firms with lower insider ownership concentration do. In other words, the concentration of insider
ownership has a negative correlation with the post-issue operating performance. In addition to that,
the authors find that the ratio of the newly issued equity to the pre-issue equity is another negative
determinant to the post-issue operating performance. This is consistent with Patel and Lee (1993)’s
conclusion on US firms as presented above. The combining finding is that if a SEO firm has both
these two negative determinants: high insider ownership concentration and large issue ratio, the
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decline in its subsequent operating performance is more dramatic.
Further, the study in Thailand also confirms the agency cost theory and information asymmetry
situation in Thailand market, similar to those in previous studies in US and UK. This means that
factors like information asymmetry level, prior-issue free cash flow, and market overvaluation,
which are observed in developed securities markets, also exist in a developing market like Thailand.
2.3 THE TWENTY SEOS-ASSESSING CRITERIA
So far, literature reviewed in previous sections has pointed out many factors relating to the
long-term operating performance of firms conducting SEOs after the issuances. As discussed, these
factors signal post-issue profitability from various aspects of the firms so they can be basement for
investors to alternate their decision of buying the newly issued shares. These factors are reported
fragmentally and sometimes controversially in different studies. This section refines and combines
these factors to create a list of criteria that can boost investors’ capability of assessing the
profitability of SEO firms.
Firstly, similar factors are categorized into five major groups based on how they affect the
post-SEO operating performance as discussed above. The categorization is expected to help
investors avoid confusion caused by the fragment of factors. The five groups of criteria are as
below:
 Market context
 Characteristics of the issuer
 Characteristics of the SEO
 The usage of the proceed from SEOs
 Ownership structures after the SEOs
Secondly, most of the explored factors are mutually independent, so each of them is used as a
criterion for the SEO screening purpose. However, some explored factors describe the same
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relationship with operating performance. To avoid repeated uses, these similar factors are replaced
by a representative criterion elaborating the relationship with the post-issue profitability. For
example, the previous section has shown that if the issuing method gives more business monitoring
power to the buyer, the SEO firm will demonstrate better profitability. Rights offering and private
placement firms perform better than public offering firms. Therefore, instead of using three factors
representing the three issuing methods, a new criterion named “rights offerings or private
placement SEO method” is created to represent the underlying relation. This criterion is considered
positively related to the SEO firm’s operating performance.
Finally, the criteria list ignores some factors which are identified in previous sections but
difficult to judge from investor point of view. For instance, “experienced and demanding institutional
investors” has been proved by literature to be positively related to post-offering profitability of the
SEO firms. However, it is difficult or almost impossible for general investors, who are not as
familiar with those institutions as able to justify their investment experience or demanding level.
Therefore, this factor will not be used as a criterion for SEO screening purposes.
After organizing the above steps, the identified factors are shortened and refined into a list of
twenty criteria (table 3). Due to the lack of current empirical literature about relative importance and
relationship among the criteria, it is impossible to determine which criteria should be prioritized over
others when multiple criteria appear together at a SEO.
Even though, the twenty criteria are still reliable bases for investors to assess the post-issue
profitability of the SEO firms and improve their investment decision. Rational investors will increase
their intention of purchasing SEO shares of a firm if it has more positive criteria than negative ones.
The question is whether investors acknowledge and correctly apply these criteria when
assessing and purchasing SEOs in Vietnam. To answer this question, the next chapter will use these
criteria in a survey on Vietnamese investors.
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Table 3: The list of twenty criteria to assess the long run profitability of SEO-firm
Criteria Relation Sources
Market context
1 High-volume market Negative Lougharan & Ritter (1997)
2 Poor industry performance Negative Panagiotis (2009)
Characteristics of the issuer
3 Fast-growing type Negative McLaughlin et al. (1996)
4 Strong information asymmetry between managers and
investors
Negative Myers & Majluf (1984),
Baker & Wurgler (2002)
5 Overvalued current listing shares Negative Myers & Majluf (1984),
Baker & Wurgler (2002)
6 High pre-issue debt ratio Negative McLaughlin et al. (1996)
7 High pre-issue FCF Negative McLaughlin et al. (1996)
8 High pre-issue profit margin Negative Loughran & Jun Cai (1998)
9 Large increment in pre-issue profitability Negative Loughran & Jun Cai (1998)
10 Managers' over-optimism about future profitability Negative Panagiotis (2009)
11 Limited number of potentially positive NPV projects Negative Jensen & Mylers (1986)
Characteristics of the SEO
12 Large issuing size Negative Patel & Lee (1993)
13 High under-pricing degree Positive Thomas et al. (2011)
14 Rights offering or private placement method Positive Chen & Yuan (2004), Dang
& Yang (2007)
15 Strong institutional investors' demand Positive Paskelian & Bell (2010)
Thomas et al. (2011)
Usages of the proceeds
16 Detailed investment plans for the proceeds Positive Autore et al. (2009)
17 Non-investment equity raising purposes Negative Paskelian & Bell (2010)
18 Investment equity raising purposes Positive Autore et al. (2009)
Ownership structure
19 High pre-issue internal ownership concentration Negative Autore et al. (2009)
20 Large reduction of management ownership after the
issuance
Negative McLaughlin et al. (1996)
Loughran & Jun Cai (1998)
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CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS OF INVESTORS’ASSESSMENT OF SEOs IN
VIETNAM
This chapter examines investors’ capability of assessment and selection of SEOs in the Vietnam
stock market. The first part of the chapter describes design and purpose of the survey and data
collection method. The second part of the chapter analyzes the collected primary data and generates
four findings.
In general, investors in Vietnam lack of academic base and thus, are confused when evaluating
and purchasing SEO shares. They do not acknowledge or have wrong awareness about most of SEO
screening criteria suggested by international literature. They tend to buy SEO shares for their
short-term and surfacing attractiveness with optimistic and incautious minds. They tend to make
right decisions using environmental criteria but get confused at criteria regarding characteristics of
the issuer or the offering itself. Three major “Vietnamese criteria” are reported implicating that
international literature on SEOs needs to be further developed to establish special criteria covering
uniqueness of emerging markets.
3.1 DATA COLLECTION
3.1.1 Contents and purposes of the survey
This study uses the twenty criteria established in chapter 2 as questionnaires to survey the
actual SEO assessing and buying actions of investors in Vietnam. The survey asks the participants
about how the SEOs assessing criteria, which have been proved in international markets, affect their
purchasing decision on SEOs shares in Vietnam.
To give an answer, a respondent may choose one out of three pre-formatted categories: “Reduce
purchase intent”, “Increase purchase intent”, and “Irrelevant” for each criterion. Before giving the
answers, respondents are informed that all criteria are related to post-issue operating performance of
the issuers. So it is reasonable to assume that respondents acknowledge the link between the
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post-issue profitability and their purchasing decision. A rational investor would reduce his intention
of purchasing the SEO shares if he thinks a criterion negatively related to the future profitability of
the issuing firm, and vice versa. If an investor ticks the box “Irrelevant”, it would be interpreted that
he does not understand either the meaning of the criterion or the relation between the criterion and
the firm’s profitability.
The prior two categories are accordingly denoted: -1 for “Reduce purchase intent”, and +1 for
“Increase purchase intent”. The choice “Irrelevant” is not denoted. This denotation means that a
criterion receives one positive point (+1) when an investor thinks it increase his SEO share purchase
intent; one minus point (-1) when an investors think it reduce his intention. Accumulated points of
each criterion represent criteria-conscious investors’ general opinion about its relation with the
long-run post-issue profitability of the firm. The design of the questionnaire used in the survey is
illustrated by the following table.
Table 4: Design of the questionnaire
Question:
The factors listed below are reported by international literature to be related with the long-run
post-issuance profitability of firms conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings.
Please choose one out of three boxes on the right of the table to evaluate how these factors affect
your decision of purchasing SEOs-shares.
Factors
Reduce purchase
intent
Increase purchase
intent
Irrelevant
1
2
……
Others …………………………………………………………………………….
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At the end of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to write down on the “Others” box other
criteria that they consider important to their SEOs shares purchasing decision. These criteria help to
explore uniqueness of the Vietnam stock market, which may be underlying reasons of the differences
between local investors’ opinion and international practice.
Then, two measures are developed to aggregate investors’ answers for analysis purposes: rating
average and percentage of responses. For each criterion, the percentage of responses in each
category is calculated by dividing the category’s total responses by the criterion’s total responses.
Percentage of response = category’s number of responses / criterion’s total responses
The figure shows which criteria are considered by investors the most appropriate to the
category. For example, if the criterion number 1 has highest percentage of response at the category
“Irrelevant”, it means investors think criterion number 1 is the least relevant to the post-issue
operating performance of a SEO firm and it almost does not affect their share purchasing desire. The
figure may also be used on accumulated responses of multiple categories.
The rating average is the weighted average of the number of responses at the category “Reduce
purchase intent” and the number of responses at the category “Increase intent” which corresponding
multipliers (-1,+1). When an investor ticks at “Reduce” box, the criterion receives -1 point and when
an investors ticks at the “Increase” box, the criterion receives +1 point.
Rating Average =
(-1 x number of responses for “Reduce purchase intent” + 1 x number of responses for “Increase purchase intent”)
Total number of responses for “Reduce purchase intent and “Increase purchase intent”
By its definition, the rating average does not take into account investors who tick at “Irrelevant”.
So it reflects the “pure” opinion of investors who acknowledge the existence of a criterion although
they may be right or wrong considering the relation between the criterion and the long-run post-issue
profitability of SEO firms. Thus, the rating average expresses the common awareness of Vietnam’s
investors about the criteria suggested by international literature. It helps to reveal whether Vietnam’s
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investors evaluate SEOs in accordance with the international practice or not. It also shows investors’
view on the relative importance of the criteria, which represent investors’ focuses when they evaluate
SEOs.
3.1.2 Data collection
The survey collected answers from 520 investors in the Vietnam stock market. The author
realized that if there is some, even small, compensation for participants, the number of responses can
be significantly higher. However, because this thesis is non-financed and subjected to the willingness
to answer of surveyed investors, the sample size is limited despite colleting efforts during a month
time.
The concept “investors in Vietnam” is understood as any person who buys and/or sells shares in
the Vietnam stock market, without any specification of their nationality, occupation, age, or income.
To ensure that respondents are qualified, the survey is sent to purposely chosen groups of investors:
- Clients of the brokerage departments of securities companies in Vietnam stock market,
where the author has worked as a securities broker.
- Popular online forums of securities investors in Vietnam, where investors exchange their
comments, predictions, and evaluation about the securities market.
Data were collected via both direct hand-out and online responding method. A professional
online survey service was employed to generate a link to the questionnaire.
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/TTCKVN
The link was distributed to targeted individuals via email and published on selected forums of
investors. The respondents access the questionnaire through the link and their responses are saved on
the server of the service company. Then, data collected from the two sources, hand-out and online,
are combined into one for analysis purposes.
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3.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The following table B describes the results of the survey. It should be noticed that even the
number of total surveyed investors is 520 the number of responses for each criterion may be equal or
less than 520 because an investor is allowed to ignore some criteria in his response.
Table 5: Summary of the survey results
Criteria
Reduce
purchase
Intent
Increase
purchase
Intent
Irrelevant RatingAverage
Response
Count
1 High-volume market 338 78 94 -0.63 510
2 Poor industry performance 442 21 47 -0.91 510
3 Fast-growing type 47 442 26 0.81 515
4
Strong information asymmetry
between managers and investors 432 26 57 -0.89 515
5 Overvalued current listing shares 354 94 68 -0.58 515
6 High pre-issue debt ratio 343 52 120 -0.74 515
7 High pre-issue FCF 109 307 94 0.48 510
8 High pre-issue profit margin 68 400 42 0.71 510
9
Large increment in pre-issue
profitability 208 203 99 -0.01 510
10
Managers' over-optimism about
future profitability 88 260 166 0.49 515
11
Limited number of potentially
positive NPV projects 406 83 26 -0.66 515
12 Large issuing size 328 83 94 -0.59 504
13 High under-pricing degree 156 270 88 0.27 515
14
Rights offerings or private placement
SEO method 140 182 192 0.13 515
15
Strong institutional investors'
demand 88 395 31 0.63 515
16
Detailed investment plans for the
proceeds 244 78 182 -0.52 504
17
Non-investment equity raising
purposes 416 52 47 -0.78 515
18 Investment equity raising purposes 62 411 42 0.74 515
19
High pre-issue internal ownership
concentration 156 198 161 0.12 515
20
Large reduction of post-issue
management ownership 296 114 94 -0.44 504
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3.2.1 Finding 1: Vietnam investors are confused at selection of SEOs for their insufficient
or false understanding of SEO screening criteria
The analysis shows that Vietnam’s investors lack of or have wrong awareness about most of the
SEO-assessing criteria. Their evaluation of SEOs does not follow the international practice so they
tend to make wrong assessments about the potential post-issue operating performance of the SEO
firms. The consequence is quite obvious: investors tend to invest in unprofitable issuers and their
share values will significantly decline in the long run.
It is noticed that the number of people think those criteria are irrelevant is quite significant.
People who tick irrelevance either think this determinant is not important, or they do not
acknowledge the existence of such a determinant in their decision making. Either way, this ignorance
will contribute to the overall market failure. Investors with their ignorance or with wrong analysis (to
increase the purchase intent instead of reduce the purchase intent), will end up distributing their
investment into the wrong company, and will see their stocks losing value in a short while, as
internationally proved in the literature review.
Thus the author adds up the Irrelevance group with the confusion group (for example, fast
growing type should reduce investor intention, but if investors tick the “increase purchase intent”
box, it means they are in the confusion zone), and label it as FALSE category. The other investors,
who correctly choose the “Reduce purchase intent” or “Increase purchase intent” boxes in
accordance with the literature, are grouped in the same category labeled TRUE. Then, the SEO
screening criteria are ranked in the order of percentage of investors who make FALSE choices as in
the following figure.
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Figure 11: Percentage of investors with FALSE awareness of SEO-assessing criteria
The result is quite impressive, and it shows that the Vietnam investors are rather confused and
not knowing what to base their decision on when buying the SEO. Only 6 criteria (blue columns in
figure 11) have less than 30% of participants making the FALSE decision, and those criteria are very
obvious and do not require much analysis.
The company is in the (1) Poor industry performance thus it’s quite obvious investors will
reduce their intention of purchase. (2)The information between managers and investors are not equal,
which means investors are afraid managers hide bad information away, and result in reducing
purchase intention. (3) If the equity raising is for investment purpose, investors will increase their
purchase intention, and (4) if for non-investment purpose they will reduce their intention. (5). If the
number of positive NPV projects is limited, which means the stock does not bring significant value
in the future. And last (6) if institutional demand for this SEO is strong, which means the stock have
been valued carefully and thus retail investor may follow the herd.
However, investors are quite confused on other 14 criteria where their relationship with the
long-run profitability of issuing firms is not so obvious, requiring more thorough understanding or
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analysis on the firms or the issuances. Instead of reducing the share buying intention, the criteria
make them increase, and vice versa.
It is observable that the percentage of FALSE investors gets higher at criteria which require
investors to have more knowledge of financial or business analysis in order to associate them with
the future profitability of the issuers. For instance, investors need to have some basic finance or
accounting understandings to determine criteria like “high pre-issue debt ratio”, “large issuing size”,
or “under-pricing degree”, and the number of “FALSE” people increases substantially at these
criteria.
Particularly, the problem becomes more severe at criteria where the issuing firms appear likely
attractive to investors. “Rights offerings or private placement” may impress investors that the
offering is restricted to some privileged people. “High pre-issue profit”, “high pre-issue FCF”, or
“fast growing” are all fancy terms focusing investors’ attention to the firm’s short-term and
pre-issuance achievements. Investors need sufficient investment knowledge and experience to
evaluate carefully the profitability of the firm in the long-run future after the SEO without being
confused by those surfacing attractiveness. And the results show that very little investors in Vietnam
can demonstrate those abilities.
In short, the wrong awareness of Vietnam’ investors about the SEO screening criteria suggested
by international literature exposes their lack of wisdom and recklessness when assessing and
purchasing SEO shares. No matter what the reason is, the failure of choosing the profitable SEOs to
invest in will lead to investors’ losses in the future when the poor operating performance of the
issuing firm reflects on its share value. At the same time, investors’ confusion also create chances for
listing firms with poor operating ability to issue shares in easy and casual manors.
3.2.2 Finding 2: Investors in Vietnam
mindsets
If investors who tick at the “Irrelevant” box for a criterion are separated, the remaining group of
investors consists of people who think the criterion either red
other words, those people acknowledge relationship between the criterion and the long
post-issue operating performance of SEO firms.
To quantify their opinion and compare with suggestions of previous studies
criteria are denoted -1 and positive related criteria are denoted +1.
“Theoretical values” or “T. Value” henceforth in order to distinguish with the rating averages given
by investors.
Then, the rating average, whi
“Reduce” or “Increase” purchasing intention, helps to reveal common
Vietnam’s investors in assessing
Figure 12: Comparation of investor’s rating averages and theor
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Figure 3.2-2 shows that 5 out of 20 criteria have rating averages opposite to their theoritical
values. These criteria are: No. 3 “Fast-growing type”, No. 8 “High pre-issue profit margin”, No. 10
“Managers' over-optimism about future profitability”, No. 7 “High pre-issue FCF”, and No. 19
“High pre-issue internal ownership concentration”. While the theoretical values of these criteria are
-1, their average ratings given by investors in Vietnam are positive.
This means that the oppinion of investors in Vietnam about these 5 criteria is contrary to the
suggestions from international practices. The literature review suggests that these criteria must have
negative relations with a SEO firm’s long run post-issue operating performance, and thus investors
should not buy the new issued shares. Meanwhile, most of investors in Vietnam wrongly consider
these criteria positively related to the firm’s profitability, or signals of buying suggestion, so they
increase their desire of buying the SEO shares instead of becoming more cautious.
Particularly, criteria No. 3 and No. 8 are two of the highest rated ones. This implicates that
instead of considering these factors signals of high-risk SEO shares, investors are excited for “fast
growing and high profit margin” companies and increase their willingness to buy those newly issued
shares. This result confirm the idea introduced in chapter I that in the Vietnames emerging market
investors are over optimistic about the furture of listing firms and usually buy newly-issued shares
carelessly.
Further, the results indicate that investors’ over-optimism comes not only directly from their
evaluation of the firm’s profitability but also indirectly from their belief to managers of issuing firms.
Literature on international practice recommends investors to be cautious of the criterion No. 10
“managers’ overoptimism about future profitability” because those managers tend to not complete
their promised plans before the SEOs. However, investors in Vietnam are likely lured by SEO firms’
rosy promises and wrongly interpret managers’ over-optimism to a signal of profitability
commitment. So they consider criterion No.10 a strong share buying suggestion and tend to make
wrong investment into the poorly profitable SEO shares.
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The positive average ratings given to criterion No.19 “high pre-issue internal ownership
concentration” is a further confirmation of investors’ belief in managers’ ability of realizing their
promised plans after the SEOs. The rating of No 19 is slightly positive at 0.12 implying that
although some investors acknowlege the consequences of “high internal ownership concentration”,
the larger part of them still misinterprets this criteria as a signal of good post-issue profitability. They
may predict that if the firm maintain it’s internal ownership managers can avoid new share owners’
disturbance and be able to realize their profit plans. This logic may be true at some SEO firms with
prevailing good management practices. However, it is not supported by empirical studies,
particularly in Thailand, an emerging market similar to Vietnam.
It seems that most of investors in Vietnam are so lured by attractive short-term financial results
of the issuing firms that they are willing to purchase SEO shares without fully considerations of
those firms’ long-run profitability. The evidence for this remark is that investors in Vietnam increase
their share purchasing desires at firms with criteria No. 8 “ high pre-issue profit margin” and No.7
“high pre-issue FCF”. Healthy profit margin and free cassh flow definitely mean that the firm is at
good condition before the SEO. If a firm with these characteristics does not issue aditional equity,
it’s listing shares are surely good for investments. However, because the operating performance of
share issuers usually changes robustly after conducting SEOs, investors should base their decision on
the long-run post-event profitablity of the firm instead of these short-term pre-event figures.
International literature has proved that SEO firms with these attractive characteristics actually
experience sharper profitability declines than other SEO firms do. Investors in Vietnam does not
likely aware of this conclusion and thus, they mistakenly purchase these SEO shares for short-term
pre-issue attractiveness.
In brief, investors in Vietnam misinterpret the meaning of 5 important criteria when evaluating
the post-issue profitability of a firm conducting SEO. They are making irrational purchasing
decisions of SEO shares because they focus on short-term figures and rosy promises of issuing firms.
Consequently, in the long run, investors suffer loss caused by their wrong investment into those
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unprofitable firms. Also, they indirectly support listing firms to abuse their optimitism to issue shares
casually or encourage unprofitable firms to manipulate financial results at costs of shareholders.
These consequences eventually all contribute to the failure of the whole securities market.
3.2.3 Finding 3: Investors in Vietnam are not capable of analyzing thoroughly the nature
of SEOs
The criteria are divided into 5 groups: the market context, characteristics of the issuer,
characteristics of the SEO, usage of the proceeds, and ownership structure. As the table 6 reveals,
investors are confused most at the criteria in the yellow group: “Characteristics of the issuers”; and
the other confusing groups are “Ownership structure” and “Characteristics of the SEO”. Investors,
lack of analysis and understanding of the SEO and the company, tend to jump at the wrong
conclusion.
Five out of nine criteria in the “Characteristics of the issuers” group have percentage of
investors with “False” awareness higher than 30%. While attractive-sounding criteria like “high
pre-issue FCF ”,“ fast growing type or “high pre-issue profit margin” have exceptionally high false
rate, confirming the finding 2, it is surprising that more than 30% of investors falsely recognize
“overvalued current listing shares” and “high pre-issue debt ratio”, quite obviously negative criteria.
This result implicates that investors in Vietnam are either irrational or careless at analyzing
characteristics of the issuing firms.
Three out of four criteria regarding “characteristics of the SEO” are recognized falsely by more
than 30% of investors in Vietnam. Investors seriously have wrong interpretation about profitability
of the firms at the size of the issuance, underpriced offers, and issuing methods. Particularly the
criterion “rights offering or private placement method” is wrongly identified by 64.6% of investors,
of which 37.4% of them consider it irrelevant to long-run profitability of the firms. The results
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implies that investors in Vietnam also do not base on or wrongly base on characteristics of the
offering itself to evaluate their investment to SEOs.
Table 6: Investors’ awareness of the twenty criteria by groups
Answer Options
Reduce
purchase
intent
Increase
purchase
intent
Irrelevant T.value TRUE FALSE
Poor industry performance 86.7% 4.1% 9.2% (1) 86.7% 13.3%
Strong information asymmetry
between managers and investors 83.8% 5.1% 11.1% (1) 83.8% 16.2%
Non-investment equity raising
purposes 80.8% 10.1% 9.1% (1) 80.8% 19.2%
Investment equity raising purposes 12.1% 79.8% 8.1% 1 79.8% 20.2%
Limited number of positive NPV
projects 78.8% 16.2% 5.1% (1) 78.8% 21.2%
Strong institutional investors'
demand 17.2% 76.8% 6.1% 1 76.8% 23.2%
Overvalued current listing shares 68.7% 18.2% 13.1% (1) 68.7% 31.3%
High pre-issue debt ratio 66.7% 10.1% 23.2% (1) 66.7% 33.3%
High-volume market 66.3% 15.3% 18.4% (1) 66.3% 33.7%
Large issuing size 64.9% 16.5% 18.6% (1) 64.9% 35.1%
Large reduction of post-issue
management ownership 58.8% 22.7% 18.6% (1) 58.8% 41.2%
Under-pricing degree 30.3% 52.5% 17.2% 1 52.5% 47.5%
Detailed investment plans for the
proceeds 15.5% 48.5% 36.1% 1 48.5% 51.5%
Large increment in pre-issue
profitability 40.8% 39.8% 19.4% (1) 40.8% 59.2%
Rights offering or private
placement method 27.3% 35.4% 37.4% 1 35.4% 64.6%
High pre-issue internal ownership
concentration 30.3% 38.4% 31.3% (1) 30.3% 69.7%
High pre-issue FCF 21.4% 60.2% 18.4% (1) 21.4% 78.6%
Managers' over-optimism about
future profitability 17.2% 50.5% 32.3% (1) 17.2% 82.8%
High pre-issue profit margin 13.3% 78.6% 8.2% (1) 13.3% 86.7%
Fast-growing type 9.1% 85.9% 5.1% (1) 9.1% 90.9%
Label Criteria group
Market context
Characteristics of the issuer
Characteristics of the SEO
Usages of the proceeds
Ownership structure
The false percentage is also considerably high at another group of critera requiring cautious
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analysis of the issuing firm: ownership structure (purple lable). 41.2% of investors wrongly
understand the consequence of “large reduction in management ownership” and 69.7% of them
wrongly recognize the effects of “high internal ownership concentration”. The ownership matter,
which refer to who influences the firm’s management most, seems not important to or too difficult to
consider for investors’ decision of purchasing SEO.
Meanwhile, investors seem to care much about the usage of the proceeds so most of them
determine correctly at two out of three criteria in this group (pink label). They correctly predict the
trend of the issuer’s profitability based on whether the firm raise equity for investment purpose or
not. However, more than 50% of investors wrongly acknowledge the criterion “detailed investment
plans for the proceeds” . This implicates that most of investors do not fully examine the usage of the
proceeds by checking the details and feasibility of those invesment plans stated by managers of the
issuing firm.
The False percentage is significanly low at the “market context” group (green label) with 87%
of investors determine correctly the link of “poor industry performance” with declining profitability
at issuing firms. This result means that Vietnam’s investors in general have correct sense of the
linkage between the market situation and the firm’s profitability.
In brief, the group analysis reveals that investors in Vietnam tend to make right prediction about
future profitability of the SEO firms if they base on rough information like market situation or
managers’ stated usages of the proceeds. They tend to make much more wrong decisions when the
investment requires deeper analysis of details about the issuers, the share issuance event, and the
plans of using the proceeds. In other words, Vietnam’s investors tend to make wrong buying decision
for their lack of ability to analyze all aspects of the SEOs.
3.2.4 Finding 4: Three additional SEO screening criteria reflect distinguished
characteristics of the Vietnam emerging market.
Investors’ writings in the “Other” box can be summarized into three major factors determining
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with the post-issue operating performance of firms conducting SEOs in Vietnam. These factors are
associated with uniqueness of the fast growing economy in Vietnam. In order to distinguish from the
twenty criteria estabished from international literature, these three factors are called “Vietnamese
criteria” henceforth.
Table 7: Three Vietnamese criteria explored from the survey
Vietnamese criteria Relation with profitability of issuers
High GDP growth rate Positive
Large reduction of State ownership due to the SEO Positive
Equity issuance to meet sector’s requirement of
chattered capital.
Negative
Even though these Vietnamese criteria do not have significant responses, they help to reveal
uniqueness of the local investors in evaluation and purchase of SEOs. They also provide suggestions
to expand current literature about SEOs to futher researches on determinants of the profitability of
SEO firms in emerging markets like Vietnam.
The first Vietnamese criterion “High GDP growth rate” seems not something special because
securities market obviously have strong relationship with the economy situation in any country.
However, this is definitely an important SEO screening criteria for distinctive characteristic of the
local securities market.
As presented in the introduction chapter, Vietnam economy has been expanding at high growth
rates for a recent decade. Still in the progress of transforming from a central planning market, the
economy, on the other hand, contains itself risks of unsustainability for weakness and inexperiences
of policy makers. Within that context, the GDP growth rate has become the most important key
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signal for the securities market guiding investors’ investment decision.
Investors in Vietnam are reasonable to associate a strong growth of the economy with
expectation of profitability improvment at firms conducing SEOs. In a well growing and sustainable
economic situation, there would be more invesment opportunities for firms to increase their profits.
An equity increment may help a firm to catch the investment chance and increase its firm value in
the future. Therefore, it is understandble that investors increase intention of purchasing SEO shares
for expectation of issuers’ improving profitability when the economy is forecasted to grow well.
Nevertheless, investors should be noticed that the relationship between the growth of the whole
economy and the profitability growth of a specific company is rather loose and not neccesarily true
at all share issuing firms. It is not odd if some companies are not able to utilize the development of
the economy to improve their profitablity. Thus, a “high GDP growth rate” may lead investors to
over-optimism or incautiousness, and then buy the SEO shares without sound analysis of the issuing
firms. This probably is a reason that fourteen out of the twenty internationally suggested SEO
screening criteria are widely misconcepted in Vietnam (see Finding 1).
The second criterion “Large reduction of state ownership due to the SEO” is an unique one that
may appear only in nations with long central planned economic history like Vietnam. As discussed in
the introduction chapter, most of listing firms in Vietnam originated from State owned companies
and the local economy is still in the progress of privatizing those state-owned parts. Hence, the
government ownership in a company plays an important role to investors’ decision of purchasing
that company’s shares.
Vietnam investors seem rational to consider this determinants a positive sign of the firm’s
profitability improvement in the future for two reasons. First, state-owned companies usually hold
certain competitive advatages over similar private-own companies, for example: priviledged nature
resource exploiting right, real estates at good locations, or closed relationship with government
officials and banking systems. Hence, a company with state-owned origin is usually expected to
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have more profit generated opportunities than a private one in Vietnam. Second, a large state’s
ownership reduction means the company’s manegement will change radically for new non-state
shareholders’ appearance. Usuaally, intrinsict bureaucracy in management will be replaced by
dynamic and efficient forces. Accordingly, these firms increase operating performance while
maintaining their competitive advantages so their newly issued shares are rather attractive to
investors.
The third criterion “Equity issuance to meet sector’s required chatered capital” derives from
another uniqueness of the Vietnam developing economy, where government sometimes intervenes
with administrative policies. In some sectors monitored strictly by the Vietnam government, firms
are required to raise their equity according to a schedule set by policy makers. The banking industry
is an example. Banks in Vietnam were commanded to raise their chatered capital to at least 3000
billion VND by 31st December 2010 under the Degree 141 issued by by the central bank of Vietnam.
The purpose of the capital requirement is to guarantee that firms in the sector have sufficient
size to operate safely and efficiently. Firms unable to match the required capital level will be
eliminated from the sector. Accordingly, firms with chatered capital lower than the requirement are
forced to issue additional shares despite that they did not intend or need to have more cash. These
firms may try any means to conduct SEOs despite any consequences in order to survive from the
requirement. For example, they may offer the new shares at very low price, which is costly for
current shareholders, or manipulate financial results to be more attractive to new investors. As a
result, these firms decrease their operating performance substantily as they did not have plans to use
the proceeds efficiently.
On the other hand, the capital increasing requirement brings chance to improve profit to leading
firms by eliminating their competitors and raising market share. The SEOs organized by these
leading firms in this case could be viewed as good investment opportunities for investors. Hence the
criterion is not necessarily always negatively related to post-issue profitability of the issuers.
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In summary, investors in Vietnam develop their own criteria to evaluated the SEOs of listing
firm in considering unique characteristics of the local emerging securities market. However, while
these criteria do not lead to absolute conclusion about expected profitablity of issuing firms in all
cases, there have not been any empirical study regarding their rightness or wrongness like literature
on the twenty international criteria. Therefore, it is believed that Vietnam investors should use these
three Vietnamese criteria together with the twenty internationally suggested criteria in order to
improve their evaluation and decision on SEOs.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
4.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
This thesis investigates the seasoned equity offered shares selection of investors in Vietnam and
concludes that investors usually make mistake when assessing potential long-run and post-issuance
profitability of the issuers. The survey provides evidences that investors seem to lack sufficient
knowledge to evaluate and select the most profitable SEOs. In more details, investors have no
awareness of or have wrong induction about most of SEO screening criteria suggested by
international literature on SEOs. When assessing SEOs, they tend to be over optimistic and attracted
by short-run financial figures or rosy plans promised by firm managers. They can only make right
decision with criteria regarding surfacing characteristics of the SEOs such as market context or
managers’ stated investment plans. However, at more sophisticated criteria requiring in-depth
analysis of the company, the issuance, or the feasibility of stated projects, investors tend to be
confused and make incautious decisions. Besides, the thesis finds out three local criteria often used
by investors in Vietnam to assess SEOs: high GDP growth rate, large reduction of state’s ownership
due to the SEO, and equity issuance to meet sector’s requirement of chattered capital. This finding
implies that investors in Vietnam are able to develop their own SEO scrutinizing criteria suitable to
the distinguished characteristics of the emerging local market. However, it should be noticed that
these criteria do not hold true in all cases of SEOs and cannot replace the twenty criteria suggested
above.
As a result, Vietnam’s investors tend have confused or wrong assessment about the profitability
of firms conducting SEOs in the long run after the event, and invest into poor performing companies.
This helps to explain why tremendous quantity of shares have been successfully issued despite
radical declines in profitability of listing firms and the deep dive of the securities market over years
from 2007 to 2010. Consequently, investors not only bear severe losses from investments into SEO
shares but also lend a hand to poor performing firms to issue new shares excessively. Furthermore,
due to the inability to distinguish profitable SEOs from unprofitable ones, investors become lose
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confidence in all listing firms. The securities market loses its role of an efficient capital raising
channel for firms with needs of funding their business. In other words, by their unwise and
incautious investments into SEOs, investors in Vietnam contribute directly to the failure of the whole
stock market.
4.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS
With the above findings, this thesis helps to fulfill the gap of literature about SEOs in several
ways. First, although the connection between SEOs and profitability subsequent to the event of
issuing firms has been well studied in prior literature, there has been no suggestion of a general
guide for investors to improve their selection of SEOs. For the first time, this paper researches
throughout related literature for factors reported to be determinants or signals of long-run post-issue
profitability of firms doing SEOs in order to create a list of twenty criteria. The criteria list even does
not provide a comprehensive method to select SEOs, is believed to be able offer investors with a
base to improve their assessment and find out the most profitable firms to invest in. Second, the
thesis adds up new understandings about investors’ selection of SEOs in the Vietnam emerging
market to current literature on SEOs, which has been majorly focused on advanced markets like the
US, the UK, or Japan. Third, the findings of the thesis contribute to the unexplored field of investor
behavior towards SEO in Vietnam. It helps investors in Vietnam to recognize their irrationality when
assessing and selecting SEOs, and also help to explain the market failure from investor perspective.
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
4.3.1 Utilize the twenty SEO screening criteria
The strongest recommendation of this thesis is that investors in Vietnam should enhance their
awareness of the twenty SEO-screening criteria. Because these criteria are established from
international literature, investors can believe in their validity of signaling the post-issue profitability
of SEO firms. Even though investors in Vietnam have their all local criteria suitable with the
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uniqueness of the market, it is suggested that these criteria are used together with the internationally
studied criteria.
Because there is no theoretical or empirical literature about relative importance or inter-relation
of these criteria, the following part suggests a simple summing-up method to assess SEOs with
multiple criteria indentified. The author acknowledges that the method is not perfect and should be
improved in future research with empirical data to quantify the degree of profitability influence of
each criterion.
The twenty criteria are assumed to have equal degree of influence to firms’ post-issue operating
performance so they are assigned value either (-1) or (+1) depending on their negative or positive
relation with firms’ profitability. Investors base on the total score of each SEO to alter their intention
of purchasing the SEO shares. In other words, investors should increase his purchase intention if the
total score of a SEO is positive and vice versa; and choose the SEO with the highest total score.
In details, investors should organize three following steps:
① First, identify criteria appearing in each examined SEO.
② Second, score +1 for positive criteria and -1 for negative and sum up the scores
for each SEO
③ Third, choose the SEO which has the highest total score
Example: An investor uses the criteria list to choose the best investment opportunity from three
SEOs conducted by two firms: A and B.
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Examined
SEO firm
Identified criteria
Scoring
formula
Total
score
A
High pre-issue FCF, Large issuing size, Investment
purpose
-1-1+1 -1
B
High under-pricing degree, High demand of
institutional investors, Limited number of profitable
projects
+1+1-1 +1
The SEO conducted by firm B should be preferred because its total score is higher than that of
firm A. It should be noticed that the total scores of the two SEOs only provide relatively comparison
between them, which shows that firm B has high possibility of outperforming firm A in term of
profitability after conducting SEO. The scores do not mean that firm A has negative post-issue
profitability while firm B has positive one. It only suggests that investors should increase their
purchase intent at firm A rather than at firm B.
4.3.2 Go beyond the surfacing and short-run attractiveness of the offers
Investors should try to do in-depth analysis on SEOs with cautious and long-term perspective.
Particularly when the firm is fast growing type or has radical profitability improvement before the
issuance, investors should look into details, for example, breakdown of the profit, and see the
underlying reasons leading to that sudden high profit, and judge whether this underlying reasons can
continue in the future. If managers of the firm seem to be too optimistic about the future profitability
with promising investment plans, investors should give question to the company and challenge their
assumptions until they show evidence and scenario-based calculation for the future. The more details
of the future plans are disclosed, the more precisely investors can assess the firm’s future
profitability. Besides, investors should also take into consideration the effects of ownership related
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matters as equity issuances often change ownership of stakeholders as well as their influence to the
firm’s operation.
Going into more details about the characteristics of the firm or the issuance event definitely
provides a clearer picture of long-term profitability of the firm than just basing on general factors
like market situation or GDP growth rate.
4.3.3 Obtain sound knowledge about the stock market and SEOs
To full fill the lack of knowledge investors are recommended to refer to theoretical and
empirical literature about SEOs. Because academic materials related to SEOs in the Vietnam
emerging market are quite scarce, prior studies in developed markets (such as mentioned in the
references) should be used and compared with the characteristic of the local market. Training
courses regarding investment on stock market also help to enhance investors’ understandings of
SEOs.
4.3.4 Consult professional’s opinions before purchasing SEO shares
In advanced securities markets, normally investors get information and advices from their
brokers and rely on the brokerage firm to get the sound analysis. This is not the case in Vietnam, and
investors are left with little information or understanding of the offered stocks. Therefore, to avoid
the risk of selecting the low profitable firms, investors should seek for advices from brokers, or
securities analysts. These professionals usually have not only academic background but also value
information about the market and the firms. Their consults will help investors to have more bases to
assess the SEOs and make right decision. However, it is also noticed that these professionals may
have related benefits at the share issuing firms and their advices are not objective. Hence,
professionals’ opinion should be considered as suggestions rather than final conclusion about the
investment in SEOs.
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4.3.5 Enhance market regulations
As a major participant in the market, investors can help improve market law and standards by
sending responses to regulators. If the regulations are better built investors are benefited in various
ways: the quality of listing shares will be improved; poor performing firms will be restricted from
conducting SEOs; information about the issuance will be more transparent etc. On the other hand,
investors’ wrong decision of buying or not buying has contributed to the overall market failure in
distributing capital efficiently. Eventually, good firm did not get the capital necessary for growth and
expansion while bad firms get plenty of cash and invest in ineffective projects. The market
capitalization will keep falling until the capital distribution becomes more effective. Thus, better
established regulations not only bring higher possibility of investment returns to investors but also
increase market efficiency.
4.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study pointed out investors’ limitation in selection of SEOs in Vietnam. However, due to
the scope of a master thesis, the sample size is still small. It is believed that in the future research,
with a larger and more diversified number of surveyed investors, the findings will reflect more
closely and in-depth reality of the Vietnam market.
Besides, even though the thesis established a list of twenty criteria helping investors to improve
their assessment of SEOs in general, the criteria list does not provide a perfect method to select
SEOs. Future research should examine the relative relation and importance among these criteria in
order to build a step-by-step method of selecting SEOs. If created and empirically tested, the method
will be a strong medium to benefiting investors in worldwide markets.
To full fill literature about SEOs in emerging markets in general and in Vietnam in particular,
several future research orientation can be taken into considerations. For instance, this thesis has
pointed out failures of investments to SEOs caused by investors’ mistakes themselves and the
consequences. Future research may be conducted to investigate similar problems caused by other
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parties such as SEO firms, market regulations, or consulting analysts. Another possible way is to
explore more Vietnamese SEO screening criteria, which are associated with the uniqueness of the
emerging market, and verify their influences on firms’ profitability by empirical studies. In addition,
the author believes that in a near future the Vietnam securities market may follow the development
pattern of the China market for similarities between the two economies. Both of them are
socialism-oriented markets originated from central planning economies and experiencing supper top
high GDP growth rates in Asia. Therefore, future research can be conducted to investigate influences
of distinguished factors related to SEOs in China such as economic development policies or
privatization of state-owned companies, and then examine those factors in the Vietnam market. In
either ways, the future findings definitely will benefit SEO-related parties, improve the efficiency of
the Vietnam securities market, and expand international literature about SEOs.
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLE OF A SURVEY RESPONSE
(This is the Vietnamese online version on www.surveymonkey.com)
